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Miscarriages of justice: What can we learn?  
 





“…you’ve had your whole life ripped to shreds and you have been hugely damaged…[these 
are] the ashes of what you had” (Barry George in BBC, 2015, n.p). 
 
This statement, made by a victim of wrongful conviction in the UK, highlights the 
devastating impact of miscarriages of justice upon individuals who suffer them.  Put simply, 
miscarriages destroy people's lives, erode public support for the Criminal Justice System 
(CJS) and are inimical to wider society (Gardner, 2015).  However, they can also have 
positive impacts, serving as ‘lessons to be learnt’ concerning what went wrong in particular 
cases.  The contribution of psychological research here, has proved invaluable in revealing 
that most of these lessons relate to the police investigative process and potential weaknesses 
of that process and in helping to explain particular phenomena, such as why individuals 
might falsely confess (Brants, 2008).  Psychologists have also advocated, and helped to 
implement improvements to investigative processes aimed at reducing future incidences of 
miscarriages (Gudjonsson, 2003; Grieve, 2007).  Nevertheless, much more remains to be 
learnt and to be done, in terms of on-going psychological research in this field.   
 
 
This chapter will consider what we have, and can, learn from miscarriages of justice in 
England and Wales, chiefly as a result of psychological research.  It will highlight what 
psychologists have discovered about the role of police investigative processes in causing 
miscarriages and how their research findings have helped to kick-start change agendas 
relating to those processes, which have in due course involved legislative, policy and practice 
reforms.  Indeed, we will see that not only does the process of criminal investigation 
contribute to miscarriages; the lessons learnt from miscarriages due to the input of 
psychological research, have contributed to the ways in which criminal investigations are 
conducted. The chapter will begin by considering ‘What is a miscarriage of justice?’  It will 
then highlight research, which reveals the causes of miscarriages, demonstrating as it does, 
that many relate to police investigative processes.  The chapter will next outline the 
contribution of psychological research to our understanding of the causes that are connected 
to police investigative processes, focussing specifically upon issues surrounding: i) the 
investigative process generally, including investigative philosophy, strategy and tactics; ii) 
interview practices involving suspects, victims and witnesses; and iii) identification 
procedures.  Official responses to lessons learnt from psychological research and 
improvements made to investigative processes and techniques as a result, are also discussed.  
The chapter ends by stressing that many opportunities remain for psychologists to conduct 




What is a miscarriage of justice? 
 
There is much disagreement concerning what the term ‘miscarriage of justice’ means.  
Definitions differ greatly, and are dependent upon individuals’ perceptions and perspectives 
and the circumstances in which the phrase is used (Leverick and Chalmers, 2014).  
Interestingly, the word ‘miscarriage’ may have derived from Plato, (whose mother was said 
to be a midwife) (Grieve, 2007) and certainly, one of the most comprehensive definitions, 
that of Walker (1999: 33-4) suggests that the term refers to a failure to reach the end goal of 
‘justice’.  However, where the State seeks to sanction an individual, the process is, by its very 
nature, coercive and unbalanced.  Therefore, ‘justice’ might be said to be an instance in 
which that imbalance and coercion is minimised to tolerable levels; hence a ‘miscarriage of 
justice’ is a situation where this does not occur (Hall, 1994).  Of major contention, is whether 
the expression ‘miscarriage of justice’ encompasses both factual innocence (i.e. an individual 
did not commit the crime for which they were convicted) and procedural innocence (i.e. an 
individual committed the crime, but as their rights were violated during the justice process, 
they should not have been convicted) (Hall, 1994).  However, in truth it is very difficult to 
identify the factually innocent (see Campbell, 2015).   
 
The aforementioned discussion highlights the importance of the integrity of the process of 
justice as much as the result of that process.  That process occurs not only in court-rooms, but 
for example, on streets (Weber & Bowling, 2012), and in police cars and police stations, 
where Walker (1999) suggests ‘justice’ is achieved when the State and its representatives, 
give equal respect to individuals’ rights.  Therefore, a miscarriage of justice is a breach of an 
individual’s rights (whether suspect, defendant, convict, victim, or witness), by the 
State/State agencies.  Walker (1999) also highlights that miscarriages can be institutionalised 
within laws and/or the result of laws being mis-applied/interpreted, as a recent Justice Select 
Committee report (2014) concerning Joint Enterprise Law exemplified.   
 
Part of the process of justice involves criminal justice practitioners dealing with victims (and 
witnesses) of crime.  Here, miscarriages can occur not only in situations where those 
practitioners have done the wrong thing, but where they have not done enough/anything in 
response to victimisation (Walker, 1999).  This can include failure to: i) investigate crimes, 
ii) identify offenders, iii) press charges, and iv) mount	a	robust	prosecution	case	(Savage,	
Grieve	and	Poyser,	2007),	resulting	in the failure to hold offenders accountable.   
 
Miscarriages of justice can also include failure to support, and poor treatment of, victims of 
crime/their families through for example, neglecting to inform them of developments in their 
case (Savage et al, 2007).  This can lead to secondary victimisation, as research by the 
Victims’ Commissioner has recently highlighted (see Bowcott, 2015).  Miscarriages may also 
be defined as failures on the part of the CJS and peripheral agencies, to recognise, intervene 
and safeguard the public from ‘known’ risks or dangerous individuals (see for example the 
case of Carl Mills in Morris, 2015).  Such miscarriages may lead to falling public confidence 
in the CJS and to individuals being less willing to engage with it (Hall,1994). In addition to 




must also recognise the rather commonplace wrongful convictions obtained in the Crown 
Courts, regularly over-turned in the Court of Appeal and those obtained in magistrates courts, 
routinely overturned in Crown Courts (Naughton, 2013), particularly as the harms resulting 
from these miscarriages, can be just as damaging as those caused by notorious miscarriages 
of justice (Ford, 1998). 
 
 
Interestingly, Naughton (2014) who contends that the label ‘miscarriage of justice’ does not 
adequately represent all types of wrongful convictions, uses the concept of ‘intent’ to 
differentiate between ‘miscarriages of justice’ which he argues, are not caused by deliberate 
acts by individuals to transgress due process and ‘abortions of justice’, which he suggests, 
are.  Importantly, however, Naughton (2014) contends that at a structural level, miscarriages 
can themselves be viewed as abortions of justice, as they are intended by a crime control-
oriented CJS that sees inherently unreliable forms of evidence, such as uncorroborated 
eyewitness testimony as admissible in court, despite psychological research (discussed 
shortly) warning that they render the innocent vulnerable to wrongful conviction.  In reality 
however, it is often difficult to ascertain whether mistake or malicious intent is behind the 
construction of individual miscarriages (Poyser and Milne, 2015). Clearly, whilst any 
comprehensive assessment of miscarriages of justice should include reference to as many 
definitions as possible, due to its particular focus, the following discourse will principally use 
the term to refer to wrongful conviction.  Nevertheless, there are clearly copious complexities 
involved in seeking an all-encompassing definition, making further debate upon this issue, 
vital.    
   
 
Miscarriages of justice: the contribution of research  
 
Scholarly interest in miscarriages of justice has increased massively over the past 20 years or 
so (Radelet, 2013), however the first substantial study in this area was published by Borchard 
(1932).  This detailed 65 miscarriages of justice (62 U.S and 3 U.K cases) and crucially 
forced a change in academic thought on the issue, from questioning whether miscarriages do 
occur; to consideration of why they occur and how we can reduce them.  Importantly, 
Borchard (1932) found that the main causes of miscarriages were: mistaken eyewitness 
identification, improperly obtained confessions, unreliable forensic science and expert 
evidence, witness perjury, inadequate defence representation, and public pressure to solve 
horrific crimes - findings that have been reflected in almost every subsequent study.  Most of 
the research that followed, consisted of small-scale studies of similar case descriptions (see 
for example, Frank & Frank, 1957; Radin, 1964; Huff, Rattner and Sagarin, 1986).  This 
changed with the publication of Bedau and Radelet’s (1987) large-scale study of 350 
miscarriages in capital cases (1900-1985), which demonstrated that miscarriages were not the 
rarity once thought.  From the mid-1990s onwards, such studies in the U.S permanently 
altered in nature, with the publication of research by Connors, Lundregan, Miller and 




prisoner’s innocence in 28 cases. Subsequent research (Leo and Ofshe, 2001; Drizin and Leo, 
2004), together with an ongoing database of DNA exonerations (Innocence Project, n.d) in 
part, spurred a series of enquiries into the legitimacy of the death penalty in the U.S (Leverick 
and Chalmers, 2014).     
 
DNA evidence has not featured highly in most miscarriages of justice in the UK, making 
such studies impossible.  Nevertheless, researchers have contributed to the scholarly analysis 
of miscarriages (Brandon and Davies, 1973; Walker and Starmer, 1999), with some work 
showing promise in terms of meeting Leo’s (2010) call for the development of theories of 
miscarriages (see Naughton, 2013).  In order to find research that has made the biggest 
impact in reducing miscarriages however, we must look to the ‘specialised causes’ literature 
(Leo, 2005: 210).  Here, the research findings of psychiatrists and psychologists, working 
primarily in the U.S and U.K on factors identified as causes of miscarriages, such as false 
confessions and erroneous eyewitness identification are presented (see for example: 
Gudjonsson, 2003; Horry et al, 2014).  Such research confirms that these causes are 
comparable historically and globally (Radelet, 2013).  Despite research highlighting a 
multiplicity of causes of miscarriages, studies worldwide indicate that the most frequent 
causes, are those linked to the police investigative process (Cutler, 2012).  They include: i) 
reliance on circumstantial evidence, ii) fabrication of evidence, iii) non-disclosure of 
evidence; iv) unreliable cell confessions (Stevens, 2010); v) unreliable confessions due to 
external factors such as police pressure and/or internal factors, such as suspect vulnerabilities 
(Gudjonsson, 2003), and vi) unreliable victim and eyewitness identification and testimony 
(Forst, 2013).   
 
 
Certainly, in the UK, many have asked ‘What can we learn from miscarriages of justice?’, 
resulting in attempts to address and reduce their causes.  This is particularly the case in 
relation to psychological research, which has provided important information to help to 
explain such phenomena and suggest changes in legislation, policy and practice to improve 
the investigative process, with the aim of lessening future miscarriages.  The following 
discussion outlines what we have, and can learn from miscarriages of justice in the UK due to 
psychological research, and how subsequent reforms have worked to address and reduce their 
occurrence in a manner that Leo (2010) insists, has not occurred in most other countrie 
 
 
Miscarriages of justice and the investigative process: from building a case for conviction 
to building a case for convicting only the guilty 
 
Although the responsibility for miscarriages of justice extends far and wide, the police 
investigative process plays a major role in their genesis (Savage and Milne, 2007).  The 
contribution of the investigative process to causing injustice, has been highlighted in many 
dreadful cases, including those of Timothy Evans and Derek Bentley, wrongly convicted and 
hanged for murder in the 1950s (Innocent, n.d).  However, the miscarriages which focussed a 




those associated with the Irish Republican Army’s terrorist activities during the 1970s (May, 
1992).  In the case of the Birmingham Six for example, suspects had not only been mentally 
and physically abused by police, evidence had been deliberately manipulated to fit in with the 
case that the police wished to present (Mullin, 1996).  At face value, the miscarriages that 
resulted from such practices were caused by false confessions and fabrication of/tampering 
with evidence. However, stepping back from this, we might ask why confessions for example, 
were such a focal concern of the investigative process in the first place.  Clearly, the 
problems leading to these, and other miscarriages that came before and after them, go much 
deeper.  Arguably, what most of these miscarriages have in common, is that from the early 
stages of their investigation, police officers believed they had the ‘right’ person and 
throughout the investigative process, sought to confirm this belief.  Potentially, these 
miscarriages were by-products of very human cognitive phenomena that led to problematic 
investigative decision-making (See Chapter 3, this volume) and ultimately inaction, 
incompetence and/or malfeasance (Findley and O’Brien, 2014).   
 
 
Psychological research in this area, has contributed to identifying how investigators make 
decisions, the factors that undermine the reliability of their decision-making, and their 
contribution to causing miscarriages (Irving and Dunnighan, 1993; Ask and Granhag, 2005).  
In particular, it has established that the phenomenon most central to the miscarriages 
mentioned above, is what has been called ‘premature case closure’ of police investigations.  
Psychologists initially alluded to this concept in relation to police interviewing, describing it 
as “…the disposition to draw pre-emptive conclusions from information processed prior to 
conducting an interview” (Shepherd and Milne, 1999: 26).  However, it is also applicable to 
the entire investigative process, whereby investigations which start with ‘investigator 
openness’ to consider many potential lines of inquiry, close, at an early stage, around a 
particular ‘thesis’ and accompanying suspect/s.  Once this situation occurs, psychological 
research suggests that starting from the assumption that they have the guilty person, tunnel 
vision, belief perseverance and confirmation bias work in tandem towards ‘successful’ case 
construction, with detectives “…selectively weav[ing] together available pieces of 
information…to produce a simplified & coherent story” (Sanders, Burton and Young, 2010: 
368).  Thus, premature closure operates around the logic of ‘case construction’ in that once a 
suspect is identified, the investigation alters from being a neutral, objective search, focussed 
upon ‘What happened?’, to being a search for information that supports suspicions that the 
suspect is the culprit (Maguire & Norris, 1992).  In this situation, investigators have focussed 
on a particular conclusion and then filtered all information in a case through the ‘tunnel-
vision lens’ provided by that conclusion. Through that filter, information supporting the 
conclusion is elevated in significance and deemed relevant and information which is 
inconsistent with the chosen theory is “overlooked or dismissed as irrelevant, incredible or 
unreliable” (Findley and Scott, 2006: 293).  Indeed, psychological research has demonstrated 
how tunnel vision is both the result of fixation on a certain suspect (bias) and the reason for a 
one-sided search for more incriminating evidence or interpretation of evidence as 
incriminating (bias confirmation), even in the face of facts that point in the opposite direction 






Importantly, as problems, which can undermine accuracy in the investigative process, are 
caused by vulnerabilities underlying human cognition, they are unintentional.  Thus, the 
investigator unwittingly assigns too much weight to evidence, which confirms their 
hypothesis, and too little to disconfirming evidence; and inadvertently clings to a belief in the 
face of evidence that discredits it (Findley and O’Brien, 2014).  Additionally, another 
psychological phenomenon, namely ‘groupthink’, may also be operating here, in that 
investigators working as part of a close-knit team, may seek to reduce conflict and promote 
consensus at the expense of questioning ideas and underlying assumptions (Orenstein, 2011).  
This may involve stifling dissent and self-censoring opinion that undermines the group’s 
decisions (Tedlow, 2010).  Clearly, in a police investigation this may exacerbate existing 
biases and undermine critical thinking, as recent revelations in Sweden’s worst miscarriage of 
justice has demonstrated (see Crouch, 2015). 
 
Certainly, the shift from considering what happened, to proving it, presents a risk that 
investigators will overlook/minimise new evidence (perhaps calling into doubt the suspect’s 
guilt) that contradicts an early theory of the case they have psychologically committed to 
(O’Brien, 2009).  Psychological research has also established that when cognitive biases 
affect early evidence gathering and processing in this way, they can thereafter taint the entire 
process, impacting upon not only decisions made by police, but by other professionals 
involved in the case (Dror and Charlton, 2006).  This can ultimately result in evidence against 
the suspect, looking stronger than it actually is and may account for situations wherein 
innocent people find themselves in court with a compelling case against them.  This problem 
arguably continues through to the appellate process where, considering that “…the evidence 
and the State’s resources have coalesced around a narrative of guilt which [frames] the 
case” (Findley and O’Brien, 2014: 40), to an appellate judge, the guilt hypothesis is 
particularly strong.  Clearly, cognitive biases have implications for appellate review and 
evaluation of fresh evidence that the CJS convicted an innocent person, thereby overturning 
the version of events that everyone involved in the case had hitherto psychologically 
committed to (Nenkov and Gollwittzer, 2012).     
 
 
Many miscarriages of justice seem to highlight that investigators in the cases operated on 
preconceived notions of guilt.  In some cases, institutional cynicism around ‘the usual 
suspect/s’, (i.e. someone known to the police through previous convictions, is quickly 
focussed upon in their investigation) may have played a role (Poyser and Milne, 2015).  
Other psychological studies suggest that even ‘inappropriate’ emotional display in the 
accused early on in an investigation, may lead investigators to adopt a mind-set that the 
suspect is guilty, causing them to neglect other investigative leads (Savage and Milne, 2007).  
Media, political, and public pressure placed upon the investigation, particularly in child 
murder cases, may also be partly responsible.  At times, this pressure can be almost 
unbearable, causing investigators to prioritise speed in bringing the case to a conclusion 




‘means’-oriented.  This may explain the alleged activities of officers in miscarriages 
associated with the child murders of Lesley Molseed and Carl Bridgewater (Innocent, n.d).  
Clearly, environmental pressures may create the conditions for system failure, which, in the 
police investigative context, may be reflected in misconduct (Punch, 2003).   
 
Allegations of misconduct appear in numerous miscarriages.  Convinced of a suspect’s guilt, 
the closed mind-set of investigating officers is sometimes pushed to the limit, with their 
activities proceeding beyond unintentionally constructing a case around a suspect, to 
intentional malfeasance/malpractice in suppressing, excluding and/or eradicating all that does 
not fit, and/or constructing evidence to ensure it does fit with the original ‘guilt’ narrative 
(Savage and Milne, 2007).  Here, police may not only ignore the facts; they may demolish or 
invent them (Sanders et al, 2010).  Some studies identify ‘police malfeasance/malpractice’ as 
featuring second only to eyewitness misidentification in wrongful convictions (Scheck, 
Neufeld and Dwyer, 2000).  It also figures in some investigations, which fail to bring anyone 
to justice (Maguire, 2003: 376).  There were allegations, for example, that such behaviour 
adversely affected the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation in 1993 (Peachey, 2012). This 
case also illustrates that premature investigative closure may also be a cause of miscarriages 
involving a failure to investigate a crime, due to ‘case denial’, as here, officers whose 
investigative mind-set was arguably closed to the theory that the crime was racially 
motivated, failed to gather evidence with this in mind (Savage & Milne, 2007). 
 
Clearly, psychological research has made major contributions to revealing cognitive 
weaknesses associated with investigative processes.  Consequently, psychologists have made 
recommendations for improving and professionalising that process in the U.K, aimed at 
minimising future miscarriages.  In this way, the lessons learnt from miscarriages have 
helped to shape the investigative process of the future.  This said, it was a specific 
miscarriage, namely the Lawrence case, which drove such recommendations through into 
policy and practice (Savage et al, 2009). In his inquiry into what could be learnt from the 
Lawrence miscarriage of justice, Sir William MacPherson (1999) identified several lessons 
relating to criminal investigation and made recommendations aimed at confronting the 
cognitive biases which had dominated it.  Concerned with the quality of, and quality 
assurance measures absent throughout, the investigation into the murder, MacPherson’s 
report emphasised the importance of review and oversight of the investigative process, so that 
if mistakes/miscalculations are made at one stage (such as those caused by cognitive biases), 
procedures are available to remedy them at later stages.  Here, MacPherson was calling for 
greater openness in investigations (so as to counter the problem of premature case closure).  
He recommended that this should be achieved through conducting rigorous reviews of 
investigations and of the decision-making involved and that the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) devise codes of practice to govern such reviews (Savage and Milne, 2007: 
623).    
 
 
Subsequently, ACPO updated their policy guidelines on the investigation of major crimes 




of institutionalising formalised review of investigations (ACPO, 2006).  The 
Professionalising the Investigative Process (PIP) programme (see also Chapter 12, this 
volume), launched by ACPO in 2005, further aimed to enhance the investigative process 
through training and development of all police investigators (Centrex, 2005a).  The Core 
Investigative Doctrine (CID) stated that this would be achieved through work-placed 
assessment and accreditation (Centrex, 2005b).  The CID advises investigators to: challenge 
dubious assumptions, promote healthy scepticism, explain gut instincts, create, and be 
receptive to, the generation of alternative hypotheses, never rush to premature judgements 
regarding the meaning of material gathered and to test the ‘null hypothesis’ i.e. to seek to 
disprove a theory (Centrex, 2005b: 23-63).  Such advice is firmly rooted in the lessons learnt 
from miscarriages of justice.   
 
The aforementioned discussion does not suggest that the task facing investigators has become 
simple.  Indeed, it often remains extremely complex (Grieve 2014) and therefore, we must 
certainly not assume ‘problem solved’.  As psychological research has highlighted, much of 
the investigative process is invisible, in terms of being behind closed-doors and cerebral.  
Therefore, challenges in ensuring that it is undertaken professionally will arguably remain 
(Stelfox, 2011).  A doctrine alone cannot ensure the type of investigative mind-set which 
effective, fair investigation requires.  Perhaps the analysis of lessons to be learnt from 
miscarriages of justice should feature in investigator training (Savage and Milne, 2007), 
because as recent miscarriages have demonstrated, cognitive biases continue to impede 
investigator decision-making.  Indeed, as Barri White stressed when his murder conviction 
was recently quashed: “[After our arrest] it then became a selective investigation. They 
didn’t look anywhere else [they] thought they had the right people” (Smith, 2013, n.p).   
Much remains to be learnt in this area, thereby providing continuing opportunities for 
psychological research. The same is true of the police interview process. 
 
 
Miscarriages of justice and the police interview process  
 
Whilst concern regarding the involvement of the police suspect interview process (see also 
Chapter 8, this volume) in contributing to miscarriages of justice did not begin with the 
Maxwell Confait murder investigation in 1972; it was this case, which pinpointed the 
contribution of the interview process, to causing them in the U.K (Price and Caplan, 1977).  
Three youths were arrested, falsely confessed to Confait’s murder, and were found guilty at 
trial.  However in 1974, judges at the Court of Appeal, quashed the convictions, labelling 
them as ‘unsafe and unsatisfactory’ and emphasising that the confessions upon which they 
were chiefly based, had been extracted from the youths under improper police pressure 
(Williamson, 2007).  Following the appeal, a public inquiry into the case established (from 
evidence provided by psychologists), that a flawed interview process coupled with the 
youths’ psychological vulnerabilities had resulted in them falsely confessing (Fisher, 1977).  
These findings set the agenda for the subsequent Phillips Commission (1981), which stressed 
the psychologically coercive nature of the police questioning process and found the Judges 




custody on suspects (particularly the vulnerable) and sought reliability in terms of the 
information they provide during interviews (Steer, 1981).  Changes to police practices and 
procedures were subsequently recommended, based on the findings of psychological research 
into police working practices, authorised by the Commission.  This research demonstrated 
that during interviews, police prioritised gaining a confession over searching for the truth of 
what happened in cases, and that this was leading to oppressive questioning and/or taking 
advantage of suspects’ vulnerabilities (Baldwin and McConville, 1981; Irving, 1981; Irving 
and Hilgendorf, 1981; Softley, 1981).   
 
 
Unfortunately, the widespread use of police threats and pressure during questioning 
continued, as later psychological research noted (Smith, 1983), thereby raising concerns 
about police conduct more generally.  This was directly responsible for driving the enactment 
of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) in 1984.  PACE and its codes of practice, 
provided a legislative foundation for the operation of police powers, suspects’ rights, and the 
regulation of custodial questioning designed to secure fairness and transparency in the 
process (Sanders et al, 2010).  Section 66, covering detention, treatment and questioning of 
suspects in custody, aimed to protect suspects during the questioning process, through 
ensuring their interviews were tape-recorded and that they were offered the right to free legal 
advice.  It also moved to secure fair treatment of vulnerable young and mentally disordered 
individuals and drove the later investigative interviewing agenda (Williamson, 2007).  The 
establishment of another of Phillips’ recommendations, the Crown Prosecution Service 
followed in 1985, removing the task of prosecuting offenders from the police (Scott, 2010).   
 
 
Official recognition of the causes of miscarriages of justice had, in part, driven such reforms, 
however they did not disburden the CJS of miscarriages; nor, as psychological research 
found, did they immediately improve the quality of police interviews.  Interview quality 
remained poor and confession-focussed, rather than searching for an accurate and reliable 
account of ‘what happened’ (McConville, Sanders and Leng, 1991; Baldwin, 1992) and 
miscarriages with causes similar to those revealed in the Confait case, continued to occur (see 
Roberts, 2007).  Clearly, individuals were still being negatively affected by poor police 
questioning and safeguards in place to protect suspects, were sometimes failing.    
The exposure of poor suspect interviewing practices in many more miscarriages of justice 
during the 1980s and 90s led to urgent calls for reform, indicating that lessons still needed to 
be learnt.  This led to the establishment of the Runciman Commission (1993), which drew 
upon the findings of 22 research studies (see for example Irving and Dunnighan, 1993) 
examining the conduct, role, and working practices of criminal justice practitioners.  Its 
report revealed that whilst PACE had increased suspects’ rights and introduced openness into 
the investigative process, gaining a confession remained investigators’ priority.  Changes in 






The latter came, to some extent with the PEACE (a mnemonic for the Planning and 
Preparation, Engage and Explain, Account, Closure, and Evaluation stages of an investigative 
interview: see Chapter 11, this volume, for an explanation of the stages) interviewing model 
(Milne & Bull, 1999).  Developed by psychologists, this model recognised that information-
gathering should play a core role in the planning and preparation for an interview, as well as 
the interview itself and consisted of two interview types: i) ‘conversation management’ - for 
less co-operative interviewees (Shepherd, 1993) and ii) ‘cognitive interview’ - for more co-
operative interviewees (Fisher and Geiselman, 1992).   
 
The UK Police subsequently trained over 120,000 officers in the PEACE model, training 
which a national evaluation found had, (in combination with the recording of interviews) 
significantly improved the quality of suspect interviews (Clarke and Milne, 2001).  Indeed, 
not only had officers’ interviewing style improved (for example, there was a reduction in the 
use of leading questions), there was also more frequent provision of information as required 
by law, such as notifying the suspect of their right to legal advice.  However, researchers also 
discovered that the listening skills of interviewing officers remained poor and that 10% of 
interviews studied, contained possible breaches of PACE (Sanders et al, 2010).  Later 
psychological research concluded that ethical interviewing techniques emphasised by the 
PEACE model, were commonly found in the police interviews analysed (Soukara et al, 2008) 
and that the PEACE model elicits a fuller account and therefore, a better interview outcome 
(Walsh and Bull, 2010).  Other research emphasised the need for refresher training (Griffiths 




Following psychologists’ national evaluation of police interviewing (Clarke and Milne, 
2001), a 5-tiered structure of interviewing skills, aimed at providing officers with theory-
driven interview training specific to their career requirements, and at developing other 
aspects of investigative interviewing, (relating to vulnerable victims/witnesses and the 
supervision and monitoring of interviews) was developed (Griffiths & Milne, 2006).  In 2007, 
this structure was incorporated into the PIP, aimed at increasing the professionalization of all 
investigators.  Subsequently, research has found that 5-tier interview training has improved 
interviewing skills and resulted in the transmission of some of the best practice learnt, to the 
wider workplace (Scott, 2010), with priority being placed upon an open-minded search for 
the truth and the collection of accurate information in investigative work more generally.  
Nevertheless, poor interviewing practices persist in some quarters, and whilst the introduction 
of PACE, PEACE and the five-tier training system has facilitated a change in the ethical 
conduct of interviews, many officers continue to believe that ‘facts’ are best secured in the 
form of a confession (Bearchell, 2010: 71).  Therefore, whilst improvements in the practice 
of police interviewing of suspects have been made, a confession focus, and the allied risk of 
miscarriages occurring, remain pressing concerns.   
 
 





Recent research analysing victims’ experiences of engaging with the CJS, revealed that many 
felt it an experience worse, than their “…actual journey of being a victim” (Newlove, 2015: 
n.p).  Crucial to any criminal investigation, is the information provided by victims and 
witnesses.  Criminal justice practitioners, particularly the police in their front-line public 
position, must not only treat victims and witnesses with respect; they must conduct successful 
interviews with them, so as to enable their voice to be heard, voices which contain 
information crucial to achieving justice in criminal cases.  Conversely, poor interviews may 
lead to miscarriages of justice, which harm the victim of the wrongful conviction and the 
victim/witnesses of the original crime (Poyser and Milne, 2015). 
 
 
Regrettably, psychological research examining interviews with adult victims and witnesses 
(see Chapter 6, this volume) has established that these are often poor in terms of their focus 
on statement-taking rather than trying to gather as much information as possible about the 
crime and very much police-led, sometimes benignly motivated in only supplying what they 
think the CJS needs (Shepherd and Milne, 2006).  It has also found that the questioning 
techniques used are problematic, particularly relating to the use of leading questions, which 
can alter human memory (Milne and Bull, 1999).  Since the introduction of the 5-tier model 
of interviewing, additional psychological evaluations of police interviewing skills with 
victims and witnesses revealed that inexperienced frontline police officers, who conduct most 
witness interviews, felt under-trained, under pressure, and ill-equipped to conduct a PEACE 
cognitive interview, despite receiving training (Dando, Wilcock and Milne, 2008).  As 
witness interviews are not routinely recorded in England and Wales (unless involving 
vulnerable, intimidated and/or significant witnesses) (Ministry of Justice, 2011) this is of 
concern, particularly because, as recent miscarriages of justice have revealed, poor police 
questioning may lead to unreliable witness testimony (see Morrison, 2013).  Clearly, 
although in the UK psychological research has contributed to changing policy and practice in 
relation to victim/witness interviewing, through its recommendations for improvements to 
interviewing standards being incorporated into a national investigative interviewing strategy, 
more work is required.  A related area where psychological research is urgently required, 
concerns the efficacy of police officers’ contemporaneous handwritten statements (Westera, 
Kebbell, and Milne, 2011).  Indeed, it has been found that due to reliance on the interviewer’s 
(fallible) memory of what was said (Conway, 2008), such statements (eventually presented in 
court as evidence) contain little detail (Rock, 2001) and many inaccuracies (McLean, 1995).   
 
With the increased societal focus on the place of victims, and indeed witnesses, within the 
CJS (Newlove, 2015), the interviewing of these key players and their provision of accurate 
information regarding the criminal incidents they experience, is likely to gain heightened 
importance (Gabbert et al, in press).  Here then, are favourable circumstances for 
psychologists and the CJS to join forces to help victims and witnesses impart reliable 






Miscarriages of justice and police procedures for eliciting eyewitness identification 
evidence 
 
In 1976, Peter Hain, a victim a miscarriage of justice caused by erroneous witness 
identification, said: “We should not be blind as to the numbers…of people…that get gobbled 
up by the monster ‘Mistaken Identity’” (in Robins, 2014: 129).  Nearly 40 years on, this 
statement remains as pertinent as ever because, as research worldwide indicates, although 
each miscarriage is generally triggered by multiple factors, mistaken identification evidence 
continues to be the major cause (Huff and Killias, 2013).  This is despite the many lessons 
learnt from psychological research (see also Chapter 7, this volume).  Eyewitness 
identification is an influential component of the CJS, affecting virtually every aspect of the 
justice process, from the initial police investigation to trial, with most professionals viewing 
it as compelling evidence in criminal cases (Cutler, 2012).  Psychological research has found 
for example, that a positive identification can guide the police investigation towards/away 
from a suspect and that police officers believe that eyewitnesses are usually correct (Kebbel 
and Milne, 1998).  Similarly, at trial, when a witness states ‘That’s the person I saw’, this is 
hugely compelling to a jury (Howitt, 2015).  Identification evidence is, psychological 
research has demonstrated, extremely fallible.  However, it is also the second most 
incriminating type of evidence after confession evidence (Kassin and Neuman, 1997), with 




The first records of miscarriages caused by mistaken eyewitness identification in England and 
Wales, date back to 1735 (Shepherd, Ellis and Davies, 1982).  However, it was not until 1860 
that formal identification (ID) parades (i.e. placing a suspect amongst a group of his/her 
peers, and requesting that a witness see if they can identify the perpetrator of the crime) were 
introduced by the Metropolitan Police.  Subsequently, procedures for such parades evolved, 
driven by the exposure of more miscarriages, including that of Adolf Beck who was wrongly 
convicted on two occasions (1896 and 1904) of defrauding women, having been erroneously 
by 10 out of 15 victims! (Naughton, 2013).  The Court of Enquiry (1904) into Beck’s case 
found that the ID parade was comprised of foils who did not resemble Beck! The Home 
Office subsequently revised the advisory codes of practice surrounding ID parades (Wilcock, 
et al, 2008), and did so again in 1925 after an enquiry into another miscarriage, caused by 
mistaken identification, involving army officer Major Sheppard (Davies and Griffiths, 2008).  
These guidelines emphasised that foils should closely resemble the suspect and that s/he 
should be told that they may have a legal representative present during a parade.  Still 
miscarriages caused by mistaken eyewitness identification continued, including those 
resulting in the innocent being hanged (see Robins, 2014). 
  
 
The still advisory guidelines were revised once more in 1969, in response to miscarriages 
exposed in a communication from the National Council of Civil Liberties to the Home Office 




2007).  Circular (9/1969) stated that an officer of inspector rank or above, with no knowledge 
of the case should conduct parades and witnesses should be instructed to say if they cannot 
make a positive identification (Wilcock et al, 2008).  Unfortunately however, miscarriages of 
this nature continued and crucially, were beginning to attract media attention, thereby fuelling 
public controversy. These cases included that of Peter Hain, who later led the campaign 
‘Justice Against the Identification Laws’ (JAIL) and that of George Davis (Poyser, 2012).  
However, it was the cases of Laszlo Virag and Luke Doherty, wrongly convicted in 1969 and 
1972 respectively that forced further change.  When their convictions were quashed in 1974 
on the basis of erroneous eyewitness identification, there was public outrage and a committee 
under Lord Devlin (1976), to review the law and procedures relating to ID parades, was 
established.  The lessons learnt here, would be those ‘delivered’ by 30 convictions based on 
mistaken identification including those previously mentioned, presented by the campaigning 
body JUSTICE (Robins, 2014).  Devlin concluded that erroneous eyewitness identification 
evidence was a potent source of miscarriages and crucially, requested that psychological 
research be conducted on it (Wilcock et al, 2008).  Devlin’s (1976) report recommended 
reforms including that: i) ID parades should be photographed for greater transparency and ii) 
if identification evidence was crucial in a case, judges should appraise the jury of any specific 
issues, such as if the witness viewed the crime in poor light.  Devlin also urged that no one 
should be convicted on contested identification evidence alone; however it remains the case 
today that a conviction can be secured on the uncorroborated evidence of a single eyewitness 
(Roberts, 2007).   
 
 
Despite Devlin’s recommendations, no action was immediately taken.  However, in 1977, a 
landmark ruling in R v Turnbull (1976 63 Cr App R 132) resulted in specific guidelines being 
established governing the way a judge directs a jury when the evidence against a person rests 
on a disputed identification (Williamson, 2007). Under the Turnbull guidelines, many of 
Devlin’s recommendations were realised in that judges were now required to warn juries to 
be cautious when relying on such evidence and to direct juries to relevant circumstances in 
which the crime occurred and the later identification took place (Sanders et al, 2010).  In 
addition, police officers were also required to cover these issues when eliciting eyewitness 
accounts (Wilcock et al, 2008).  Juries also had to be warned that a mistaken witness could 
nonetheless be a convincing one, and that many witnesses could all be mistaken.  Seven years 
later legislation governing constructing and delivering ID parades, came into force.  PACE, 
1984, Code D set out the procedures (revised since on several occasions) for the conduct of 
identification attempts, aiming to ensure that these were planned, monitored and properly 
recorded (Naughton, 2013).  In addition, psychologists did respond to Devlin’s request for 
more research to be conducted on eyewitness identification and their findings have resulted in 
more lessons being learnt and further improvements in procedures surrounding identification 








The application of psychological research to this area 
 
The 1970s in particular, was a key phase in terms of Psychology’s contribution to 
understanding witness identification performance, with ground-breaking work by Loftus 
(1979) in the U.S and Clifford and Bull (1978) in the U.K.  Through this, and subsequent 
studies, psychologists have shown that the roots of eyewitness fallibilities lie in human 
memory, which alters over time and is suggestible and susceptible to error (Thompson et al, 
1998).  More troubling is that their work since (including several meta-analyses), has 
consistently confirmed that eyewitnesses often perform at a level not better than chance 
(Memon, Hope and Bull, 2003).  Psychological research has established that our ability to 
successfully remember a crime and identify its perpetrator, relies on three stages: i) 
perception and encoding of the crime, ii) retention of the information, and iii) retrieval of that 
information (Wilcock et al, 2008) and that many factors including i) social perceptions and 
demographic features of witnesses; ii) situational factors; and iii) facets of interrogative 
situations, can influence any/all of these stages and therefore eyewitness performance in a) 
person descriptions and b) identification (Davies and Griffiths, 2008).   
 
 
a) Person descriptions 
 
Psychological research has demonstrated that many factors may affect eyewitness accuracy in 
providing person descriptions to police, whether in an initial emergency call (Ambler and 
Milne, 2006), a police interview (Milne and Bull, 1999), or whilst constructing facial 
composites (Wells, Charman and Olsen, 2005).  These include factors relating to: i) the 
witness themselves, including: age (Milne, 1999), gender (Sporer, 1996), ethnicity (Meissner 
and Brigham, 2001), and attitudes, experiences, expectations, prejudices and stereotypes 
(Chance, Goldstein, & Sporer, 1996), ii) conditions under which the crime was viewed, 
including: lighting (Sporer, 1996), stress levels of the witness/victim, and the presence of a 
weapon at the scene (Steblay, 1992), witness involvement (Yuille and Tollestrup, 1992), and 
factors relating to attention paid to the event (Fruzzeti et al, 1992); and iii) memory retrieval, 
including: time lapse between viewing the crime and giving a person description (Ellis, 
Davies and Shepherd, 1978), witness collaboration (Gabbert, Memon and Allan, 2003), and 
the way in which information about the crime is elicited from witnesses during a police 
interview. Here, the asking of leading questions (Milne and Bull, 1999) and repeating 
questions (Brown, Lloyd-Jones and Robinson, 2008), can affect the quality and quantity of 
person description.   
 
 
As previously mentioned, tools developed by psychologists, such as the PEACE cognitive 
interview, have, to some extent, improved the quality and quantity of information gained 
from eyewitnesses during interviews (Milne and Bull, 1999).  Psychologists have also 
suggested that such interviews are recorded electronically, so as to ensure that all information 
reported is captured (Wilcock et al, 2008).  Additionally, psychologists have stressed that 




crime scene (to, as far as possible, preserve it and avoid contamination) (Wells and Loftus, 
2001).  However, presently this does not occur and therefore the risk of miscarriages caused 
by contaminated witness memory remains. 
 
 
b) Person identification  
 
Psychologists have discovered that many factors affect eyewitness accuracy in ID parades 
and have divided these into i) estimator variables (the effect of which on subsequent 
identification accuracy can only be estimated after a crime’s occurrence and which therefore, 
the police cannot control) and ii) system variables (that are under the control of the police) 
(Wells, 1978).  The discussion below only briefly mentions estimator variables (see Chapter 
6, this volume, for more detailed coverage of estimator variables as applicable to eye-
witnesses) as psychological research on system variables has had more impact on criminal 
justice practice.  
 
 
i) Estimator variables 
 
Psychological research into the effect of estimator variables on eyewitness identification 
performance has been substantial, including two meta analyses (see Shapiro and Penrod, 
1986 and Narby, Cutler and Penrod, 1996).  Such research has demonstrated that i) witness 
factors such as: age (Valentine, Pickering and Darling, 2003), race (Meissner and Brigham, 
2001), gender (Wright and Sladden, 2003) intelligence (Wojcikiewis, 1990), personality 
(Hosch, 1994) occupation (Christianson, Karlsson and Persson, 1998), expectations and 
stereotypes (Kassin et al, 2001) and confidence (see Sporer et al, 1995; Brewer, 2006); ii) 
perpetrator factors, such as race (Meissner and Brigham, 2001), gender (Shapiro and Penrod, 
1986), distinctiveness of face (Valentine, 1991), and use of disguises (Patterson and Baddley, 
1977); and iii) situational factors, including stress and arousal (Deffenbacher et al, 2004), 
weapon presence (Loftus, Loftus and Messo, 1987), alcohol consumption (Dysart et al, 
2002), and view of perpetrator (Shapiro and Penrod, 1986) may affect eyewitness accuracy 
(Dysart et al, 2002). These findings have permitted criminal justice practitioners to make 
more informed decisions on the impact of some estimator variables upon later identification 
performance (Wilcock et al, 2008).  
 
 
ii) System variables 
 
A lesson to be learnt from miscarriages of justice is that inadequate procedures used by the 
CJS are often responsible for mistaken identifications (Bedau and Radelet, 1987). 
Psychological research conducted on system variables has demonstrated the utility of one 
procedure over another, thereby helping to steer current UK legislation and guidelines and 
improve methods relating to ID parades (Wilcock et al, 2008).  Examples of system variables 




   
In relation to constructing line-ups, psychological research has demonstrated the importance 
of considering: i) numbers of suspects per parade - recommending one per parade, ii) size of 
parade - recommending that the larger the parade, the less likely the suspect will be identified 
by chance alone, and iii) bias in a parade – recommending that all foils should be viable 
alternatives to the suspect (Wells and Turtle, 1986).  These recommendations have influenced 
PACE code D, which stipulates that a parade must contain at least 8 foils, selected via the 
‘match to similarity of suspect method’ (Darling, Valentine and Memon, 2008). 
 
Regarding presentation of a line up, psychological research has found little difference 
between live, video tape and photo line-ups in terms of witness performance (Shapiro and 
Penrod, 1986).  However, as video parades are easier, cheaper, more convenient for 
witnesses, and possibly fairer to suspects from all ethnicities (see Valentine, Darling and 
Memon, 2007), they are used in the U.K.  Psychological research has been unable to 
conclude whether, in order to reduce erroneous identifications, line-up members should be 
presented simultaneously or sequentially (as is the case in the U.K) (Lindsay and Wells, 
1985; Flowe, 2014).  Therefore, further research is required.   
 
Regarding administration of a line-up, the findings of psychological research suggest that, 
line-ups should be administered double-blind, where the administrator is naïve to the 
suspect’s identity and position (to avoid inadvertent transmission of cues to the witness) 
(Garroch and Brimacombe, 2001).  It has also established that line-up instructions given to 
witnesses should be inform them that the perpetrator may/not be there. This reduces 
erroneous identifications (Malpass and Devine, 1981) and is a requirement of PACE Code D.   
 
 
What else could we learn? 
 
Psychological research has made major contributions to our understanding of identification 
procedures and has guided legislation relating to line-ups, thereby making them fairer to 
witnesses and innocent suspects.  However, before ending this discussion, we must also 
acknowledge, psychological research concerning voice identification, which indicates that it 
is considerably error prone (Clifford, 1980; Philippon et al, 2007). Further research is also 
required to understand why vulnerable witnesses (due to for example, their age or learning 
disabilities) are particularly prone to making false identifications from line-ups (Pozzulo, 
2014; Wilcock and Bull, 2014).  The CJS needs to urgently understand which investigative 
methods might aid their performance in target absent situations (Wilcock et al, 2008).    
 
Further psychological research is also arguably required in order to understand why, despite 
the regulations/guidelines surrounding this area, criminal justice practitioners still sometimes 
fail to do what they are required to do.  This includes judges failing to give correct Turnbull 
warnings (see Naughton, 2013) and police officers failing to comply with the regulations 
governing how they must obtain identification evidence.  Indeed, as noted at Patrick Quinn’s 




laid down in a statutory code…it is not for the police to substitute their own rules and 
procedures” (R v Quinn, p.481 cited in Naughton, 2013: 90).  Such miscarriages strengthen 
calls for psychologists to continue to conduct research in this area, where possible, through 





Some errors - structural, systemic and even malign - are perhaps inevitable in all human 
systems and the CJS is no exception (Grieve, 2007).  Miscarriages of justice are generated by 
a multitude of factors, which we can never rid the system of entirely (Forst, 2013).  
Nevertheless, we should take all steps possible in order to learn from our experiences and 
minimise their occurrence.  As many of the causes of miscarriages relate to police 
investigative philosophy, strategy and tactics, and in particular interview and identification 
processes, most of these steps should arguably be centred on these issues.  Certainly, there is 
an on-going opportunity for criminal justice practitioners to learn many lessons from 
miscarriages of justice and to make appropriate changes to policy and practice in doing so.  
Psychological theory and research has, we have argued, made huge contributions to our 
understanding of some of the causes of miscarriages, thereby helping us to learn those 
lessons, which include the fact that: i) high-calibre pre-trial investigation and custodial 
questioning processes will reduce reliance on confession evidence and encourage a search for 
the truth, ii) good quality and more thorough questioning of victims and witnesses will enable 
them to provide their best evidence, iii) greater sensitivity in dealing with, and interviewing, 
vulnerable individuals, will permit them to give their best interview and identification 
evidence and iv) criminal justice practitioners’ adherence to due process rules and 
regulations, will ensure that the efforts of psychologists in these areas are not wasted.  
Psychological research has demonstrated, through its practical impact, that the risk of 
miscarriages of justice occurring, can be minimised through such measures.  Crucially 
however, there remains much work to be done and a range of opportunities for psychologists 
to continue to identify weaknesses and propose reform based on scientific research of the 
kind that has been so valuable in reducing miscarriages to-date.  In addition, recent austerity 
measures must not be allowed to undermine the progress that psychology has helped to 
instigate (Grieve, 2014).  After all, surely a civilised society is morally obliged to ask ‘What 
can we learn from miscarriages of justice?’ At the very least, it owes all the victims of its 
mistakes and malfeasance, this, so as to try to meet their appeal for '…no one else [to] suffer 
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